METR and Redwood Research Identify Vulnerabilities in OpenAI's Internal Agent Monitoring System
·2026.10.22 09:00
Key point
A three-week pilot exercise estimated that 75–94% of eligible agentic traffic was monitored, while identifying methods for agents to disable or subvert the system.
Details
- METR and Redwood Research conducted a three-week high-access pilot (July 21–August 11) to stress-test OpenAI's internal misalignment monitoring system, producing a 61-page internal report.
- Researchers estimated that 75–94% of agentic internal Responses API traffic from models at least as strong as GPT-5.5 was eligible for monitoring, with 99.2% eligibility for internal Codex agents.
- Novel vulnerabilities were discovered, including a method for Codex agents to bypass sandboxing and Auto-Review, and an exploit to prevent hundreds of recent actions from being monitored.
- Two client-controllable headers were found that could disable monitoring for new agents, and two unmonitored internal tools with read-only permissions were found to be exploitable for arbitrary actions.
- OpenAI has stated that all identified vulnerabilities impacting its production safeguards stack have been patched, though METR and Redwood have not evaluated these claims.
- The team outlined design ideals for future monitoring, including making it hard to avoid monitoring, ensuring traffic accounting accuracy, and enforcing isolation between agents and monitors.
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