The Bromine Bottleneck: Why Middle East Tensions Could Halt Global Memory Chip Production

If Israel's bromine supply is disrupted, the hydrogen bromide gas made from it for semiconductors gets blocked, immediately hitting DRAM and NAND production. In particular, Korea relies on Israel for 97.5% of its bromine imports, so the argument is that a single geopolitical shock could spread into the global memory supply chain.

Bromine is not just an ordinary industrial material—it's a chemical that is essential to the semiconductor etching process. There is effectively no substitute, converting existing industrial-grade bromine back to semiconductor-grade is not possible, and building new semiconductor-grade refining infrastructure takes years. External producers do exist, but they're already tied up with existing demand from TSMC, Samsung, SMIC, and others, so the explanation is that they lack the capacity to ramp up production immediately.

The risk is amplified by the fact that Israel's logistics and production hubs lie within range of military strikes. Citing rising marine insurance premiums, port surcharges, and cases of refinery damage, the piece argues that production and transport could halt even without a direct hit. It warns that if ICL Group's Dead Sea/Sodom production and conversion facilities are disrupted, the supply shock would propagate immediately into the global memory market.

The ripple effects reach consumer electronics, AI infrastructure, and even defense.

• Samsung and SK hynix account for roughly 70% of global DRAM.
• SK hynix holds about 57% of the high-bandwidth memory (HBM) market.
• DRAM suppliers reportedly hold only about 2-3 weeks of inventory.
• HBM is described as already sold out through 2026 due to concentrated demand from AI accelerators.

If supply is cut off, companies will prioritize allocating the high-margin HBM, resulting in shortages of ordinary DRAM and NAND, driving up prices for smartphones, PCs, and storage devices. Budget smartphones in Africa, South Asia, and Latin America are seen as particularly hard-hit, with accessibility of entry-level devices—where memory makes up a large share of cost—worsening further. In defense as well, since missile guidance systems, radar, and electronic warfare equipment use the same commercial memory supply chain, the piece points out that civilian shortages would directly translate into military shortages.

Three solutions are proposed.

• Short term: secure non-Israeli sources such as Arkansas bromine in advance and lock in at least 12-18 months of supply through forward contracts.
• Medium term: build new semiconductor-grade hydrogen bromide gas conversion facilities in allied countries such as Korea, Japan, and the U.S.
• Policy: Korea should designate bromine as a critical mineral, the U.S. should use the Defense Production Act and CHIPS and Science Act to invest in refining and conversion capacity together with allies, and Israel should manage it as a strategic export and strengthen facility protection.

The core conclusion is simple: the current problem isn't simply a war—it's that the entire global memory supply chain is built on a single conversion bottleneck. Since there is no alternative route to bypass that bottleneck, the argument concludes that current responses can only buy time through inventory and contracts, and the structural solution ultimately requires building new, geographically diversified production capacity overseas.